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I
INTRODUCTION
Much contemporary discussion of “the market” assumes that it has an
immanent logic that leads inexorably to runaway inequality, an erosion of
corporate accountability, and the commodification of education, health, politics,
and other basic goods. However, markets arise out of and operate through law—
not just through public regulation but also through private law regimes (in
property, contract, and tort) that create entitlements, enforce market exchanges,
and limit expropriation. Appreciating the significance of law as the infrastructure
of markets reveals that no particular market structure is inevitable. Instead, every
market order is the result of a complex set of legal and political choices.
This Issue of Law and Contemporary Problems investigates the legal
foundations of market orders. In this Foreword, we rely upon the Articles that
follow to offer an intellectual roadmap for a legally-informed study of the market.
These rich and thought-provoking Articles underscore the fundamental role of
law in the constitution of markets, as well as the options, limits, dangers, and
responsibilities that the legal construction of markets entails.
One lesson that we take from these writings is that the market can be thought
of as a thick ethical concept that can be understood only by combing facts and
norms, which cannot be prised apart without doing damage to both. This means
that different forms of the market in fact instantiate differing normative visions
of the market. To flesh out and generalize these evaluative aspects, we conclude
in Part VI with a sketch of three competing visions: efficient markets, democratic
markets, and liberal markets. We acknowledge that real markets are imperfect
instantiations, and at times hybrids, of these ideal-types. In addition, the types
may be further divided, oftentimes with crucial distinctions among their rival
variants. But for purposes of this Foreword, our goal is modest: we have no
ambition to offer a complete taxonomy of market orders or to resolve the debate
over the market’s normative foundations. We hope only to bring home our
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conclusion that any adequate inquiry into the market must take this normative
debate into account.
II
MARKETS AND LAW
The markets that saturate modern life come in various forms: in goods and in
services, domestic and transnational, off-line and on-line. Their pervasive
presence produces two understandable but unfortunate effects on discourse, both
public and academic. First, at times the discourse sounds as if markets are simply
part of our natural environment, a brute given of the human condition, like our
need for air to breathe. Second, even where no such naturalization takes hold,
another form of reification often arises: a presupposition that “the market”
necessarily follows one form that, at its core, possesses a given set of necessary
and sufficient features. Both champions and critics tend to celebrate or criticize
the market, implying that we all know what this means and that it necessarily
means that one thing.
The notion of “intervention in the market” vividly manifests both tendencies.
Intervention may have both negative and positive connotations. So-called market
fundamentalists typically emphasize the negative: they tend to perceive any rule
or regulation intended to affect the existing operations of a given market as a
priori suspect, either because it artificially meddles with the market’s operations
or because it might distort the market’s natural, and by extension beneficial,
tendencies. Market skeptics, on the other hand, apply an almost mirror-image
presumption against markets, treating the market as a wild force against which
we should guard.
Because markets are powerful institutions that significantly impact
individuals, affect relationships, and shape societies, their design should be
carefully scrutinized. And because markets are the creation of human societies,
and the shape of any market depends heavily on the legal rules that guide nearly
every step in market actors’ behavior, this scrutiny must be particularized.
Lawyers and legal scholars ought to be especially attentive to particulars in
framing and evaluating these legal rules. A proposed new rule for the law of the
market may be troublesome or it may be desirable, but the idea that any new rule
intervenes (for better or for worse) in the market makes no sense. Instead,
markets necessarily depend on well-designed and well-enforced rules of the
game: they rely on, and are constituted by, a legal infrastructure.
Markets, in other words, are at least in part legal constructs. And the law
influences their construction. Evaluating the merits of any proposed legal reform
in this space necessarily relies on particular normative conceptions of the good
that markets, or the particular market in question, might supply. But the fact that
a given rule or doctrine is (or is not, or is not yet) part of the law of the market
does not make it more (or less) interventionist, because the existing rules of a
given market do not epitomize the necessary configuration of the market. The
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status quo, being itself a legal construct, cannot serve as a baseline against which
to measure legal intervention.
Markets are varied, and talking of the market counterproductively
essentializes or reifies the status quo. But this should not be taken to suggest that
analysis of markets’ principal features is a pointless exercise. While variations are
crucial, markets typically revolve around certain basic features worth
emphasizing. Markets are complicated “social and institutional arrangements
through which goods [and services] are regularly produced for, distributed by and
subject to contractual forms of exchange in which money and property rights over
goods [or rights to services] are transferred between agents.”1 Markets are robust
infrastructures that enable systemic, repeatable acts of exchange, and especially
exchange among strangers. Smoothly functioning markets rely on defined and
respected property rights and rest on the idea that contracts should be honored
and, if necessary, enforced. Moreover, while some types of trade—ranging from
primitive forms of barter to intricately developed gift exchange—are possible
without markets, trading systems that become sufficiently widespread such that
they reasonably establish market societies must rely on a common, acceptable,
liquid currency—namely, money—to facilitate trade.
Contract is the key mechanism for exchanging entitlements, and this makes
contract central to markets, however conceived. Accordingly, many of the
Articles in this Issue consider how the law of various contract types—involving,
for example, commercial dealings, consumer goods, or employment
relationships—plays a crucial role in the construction of commercial, consumer,
and labor markets, respectively.2 Similarly, law can variously prescribe the scope
and content of the property rights of owners over the means of production, which
dramatically affects the contours of our labor markets.3
Often, even cursory attention to law suffices to realize its indispensable work
in the construction of the market (or, more precisely, of a given market, since
different markets are differently designed). But at times law’s constructive role
is more opaque, for two distinct reasons. First, the role of law may be such an
entrenched aspect of background understandings that its arrangements seem
axiomatic, or even conceptually necessary. Second, law’s work may be indirect.
Its effect may be an offshoot, or an unintended consequence of a legal doctrine
whose raison d’être actually lies elsewhere. Two of the Articles in this Issue offer
telling examples.
Christine Desan’s The Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in
Neoclassical and Credit Approaches to Money4 highlights this first aspect of law’s
1. JOHN O’NEILL, THE MARKET: ETHICS, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 4 (1998).
2. See, e.g., Christine Desan, The Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in Neoclassical
and Credit Approaches to Money, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 1; Robert E. Scott, The
Paradox of Contracting in Markets, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 71; Kathleen Thelen,
Employer Organization and the Law: American Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective, 83 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 23.
3. See HANOCH DAGAN, A LIBERAL THEORY OF PROPERTY ch. 7 (forthcoming 2020).
4. Desan, supra note 2.
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opacity by exposing law’s often obscured role at the most elemental level of
constructing markets: creating the money that generates commensurable value
that in turn facilitates ordered and preference-maximizing trade. On Desan’s
account, market economies cannot get off the ground without money that makes
otherwise random desires into ordered and comparable values. Money is thus the
condition of possibility for the emergence of widespread markets. But money is
not a project conducted in pure abstraction. Instead, the concrete legal
arrangements that form money’s design inevitably push and pull people towards
specific activities. A money system based on commercial banking privileges
profit-making activity with relatively short time horizons. A system based solely
on government-issued money would (and historically did) push towards different
goals. Markets based on differently designed moneys do not simply facilitate preexisting preferences; they participate mightily in the very formation of values that
people will pursue and through which they will understand themselves as
individuals and as societies.
Kathleen Thelen’s Employer Organization and the Law: American
Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective5 highlights the second aspect of law’s
opacity in our understanding of markets: how law’s indirect effects can become
central for resulting market frameworks. Her comparison of Germany and the
United States traces the collaborative relationship between labor unions and
employers’ associations of small entrepreneurs. In both settings, small- and
medium-sized manufacturers saw organized labor as a potential partner in
protecting themselves against cutthroat competition from marginal producers. In
Germany, trade associations succeeded in coordinating strategy and negotiating
with unions. In the United States, however, the loosely coordinated legal activism
of small proprietary capitalists undermined burgeoning coalitions between
employer organizations and unions. That legal activism took the form of antiunion litigation based on antitrust law, and it was successful enough to weed out
the kinds of sectoral employer and trade organizations that survived in the
European legal context. American antitrust law was born out of concerns about
large concentrations of capital, but it was instead successfully directed against the
unions. This shift in orientation pulled the rug out from under the cooperative
frameworks developing between unions and employers.
III
ARCHITECTURE
The notion of a legal construct does not imply that law’s architects can design
the market in whatever shape they choose, as if writing on a blank slate. To be
both legitimate and effective, law must face (respectively) justificatory and
instrumental constraints. Consider first the instrumental constraints, which the
architects of the law must recognize if they are to rise to the challenges of

5. Thelen, supra note 2.
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constructing successful markets. Both the constraints and the challenges derive
from the same truism: law’s prescriptions are not self-executing. They are
mediated by legal institutions, and their effects depend on the responses both of
their addressees and of third parties who may be interested in the subject matter
at hand. Appreciating the significance of these two dimensions is key to
understanding the constraints and the challenges faced by the law of the market.
The institutional dimension is particularly acute in the common law tradition,
which strongly associates private law with adjudication. Court proceedings are
sometimes perceived as an obvious home for the law of the market, since
adjudication is designed to assess the parties’ behavior vis-à-vis their
interpersonal rights and obligations as well as to refine the rules that delineate
these rights and obligations to begin with. But in a complex and interconnected
society, it is increasingly difficult to expect courts to be solely responsible for the
provision of the infrastructure needed for a secure marketplace. This is a mission
that often requires general legislation, and at times a full-blown administrative
apparatus, to supplement or even supplant courts. The law of the market is
therefore a product of a joint venture among legislatures, administrative
agencies, and a host of quasi-public and even fully private organizations, all
working alongside courts.6
There is widespread agreement that regulation should attempt to address
systemic market failures.7 When monopolies, externalities, or informational
inadequacies are rampant, an “uncontrolled marketplace” will likely “fail to
produce behavior or results in accordance with the public interest.”8 But often
regulation is also useful—and sometimes indispensable—for another purpose:
the articulation, development, and vindication of market actors’ interpersonal
rights. It may be necessary for ensuring the generality of legal prescription,
allowing people to adjust their behavior to conform to the rule of law,
maintaining the required technological expertise for legal decision making, and
establishing effective tools for proactive (as opposed to reactive) ex ante
guarantees of people’s interpersonal rights.9

6. Think of the International Financial Reporting Standards Foundation (IFRS), a not-for-profit
corporation whose standards govern accounting in over 140 jurisdictions. About us, IFRS,
https://www.ifrs.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/CFX2-ETPA]. Additional examples of “private”
lawmaking, especially in the transnational sphere, could be multiplied with ease. For examples including
banking, money laundering, insurance, and securities regulation, see generally DAVID ANDREW SINGER,
REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2007);
Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011);
Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 20 (2011); David
Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563 (2007).
7. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 55–63 (1990).
8. ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION:
THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 15 (2d ed. 2012); see id. at 15–22 (discussing market failure
rationales for regulating markets).
9. See Hanoch Dagan & Roy Kreitner, The Other Half of Regulatory Theory, 52 CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020).
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Institutional considerations figure importantly in effective regulation. Those
who design the law of the market should attend to the virtues, limitations, and
possible pitfalls of the expected performances of the various institutions involved
in regulating market life. Moreover, law—especially the law of the market—must
also anticipate and consider the expected responses of the pertinent private
actors. Well-informed and sophisticated parties are especially likely to take law’s
prescriptions as incentives rather than norms. In other words, legally-informed
actors—both law’s potential addressees and interested third parties—may act in
ways that circumvent the law’s intended effects and thus possibly undermine its
normative underpinnings. If the architects of the law of the market are interested
in law’s expected consequences, they must take seriously its incentive effects and
be particularly attentive to the concern of counterproductive legal prescriptions.10
Consequently, designing the law of the market is a complex task. The
designers must examine the likely responses and counter-responses of market
actors in order to foresee the ultimate outcomes of the competing legal regimes.
These complications are further exacerbated in a globalized environment, which
is increasingly typified by international regulatory competition.11 At times, these
complications might frustratingly suggest that certain objectives or normative
commitments are elusive. More often, they imply that achieving a normative goal
is not as straightforward as it may seem; that choices must be made among
competing imperfect alternatives, each of which must be carefully designed and
institutionalized.
Kim Oosterlinck, Joseph Blocher, and Mitu Gulati’s Article, Why Did
Belgium Pay Leopold’s Bonds?,12 draws on Belgian King Leopold II’s reign over
the Congo Free State (CFS) to study the interactions among market forces and
legal doctrines that might police illicit conduct. King Leopold II, effectively the
private owner of the CFS, relied heavily on issuing bond obligations to establish,
run, and brutally exploit his private colony. Sovereign borrowing markets could
have reacted to his horrific abuse of his Congolese subjects in at least two ways.
First, the markets could have raised the costs of the loans issued by Leopold II
on behalf of the CFS. Second, Belgium, the successor government to this despot,
could have repudiated King Leopold II’s debt by invoking the doctrine of odious
debts. The two reactions are intimately related as the former might follow from
the possible occurrence of the latter. Hence, the legal doctrine of odious debts
may put economic, not merely moral, pressure on the market standing of a
malevolent despot.
However, the authors find no evidence of any market penalty on the debt that
funded Leopold’s wicked rule. Nor did Belgium invoke the odious debts doctrine

10. See generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
11. See, e.g., Bruce G. Carruthers & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Regulatory Races: The Effects of
Jurisdictional Competition on Regulatory Standards, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 52 (2016); Tsilly Dagan, The Global
Market for Tax and Legal Rules, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 148 (2017).
12. 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 49.
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upon purchasing the CFS from Leopold; instead, it accepted responsibility for his
debts and paid them. What makes these outcomes possible is the legal design of
the securities markets on which the debt traded. In particular, presenting the
doctrine of odious debts as an option held by the successor government opens
the way for lenders to base their borrowing decisions on financial, rather than
moral, reasons. As a result, the otherwise important distinction between sinful
and virtuous bonds becomes optional as well.
Robert Scott’s Article, The Paradox of Contracting in Markets,13 in turn,
demonstrates both the challenge of setting up the rules of the law of the market
so that they properly serve a desired normative goal (in Scott’s case, efficiency)
and the institutional dimension that must accompany such inquiries. Efficiency,
he claims, implies two quite different objectives: improving contractual incentives
that motivate parties to invest and trade; and economizing on the production
costs of contracts by facilitating the parties’ abilities to realize the scale
advantages of standardization. The difficulty is that these two objectives conflict.
Standardization and economies of scale, which are key to the efficient production
of contracts, tend to undermine the efficiency of contractual incentives. And
bespoke efforts to motivate efficient investment and trade generate a loss of scale
and thus inefficient production of contracts.
Drawing on the way contracting parties in thick, multilateral markets
optimize between these two conflicting effects, Scott claims that the key to
efficiency lies in creating a functioning network of effective coordination, which
can overcome the collective action problem that entrenches inefficiencies and is
endemic to the process of producing contracts in thick markets. This solution,
however, is unavailable in multilateral consumer markets. But it can be, and to
some extent has been, substituted with a regulatory structure that can coordinate
efforts to produce more efficient consumer contracts, thus avoiding the existing
pricing errors that end up as rents that producers currently capture.
IV
DANGERS
Some observers believe that central planning does not present a viable
alternative for organizing large-scale economies, which means that the market
economy is the only game in town.14 Others, of course, disagree.15 But even if, or

13. Scott, supra note 2.
14. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM
AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 48 (2018).
15. The government of Cuba, for example, instituted a planned economy following the 1959
Revolution and continues to plan much of the island’s economic activity even today. See generally
JONATHAN C. BROWN, CUBA’S REVOLUTIONARY WORLD (2017).
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maybe especially if, the former view is correct, it is important to identify the
immanent risks that market modes of organization typically raise.16
Market essentialists view this inquiry as the battlefield over whether market
ordering is acceptable at all (either generally, or in one specific realm of activity).
In certain contexts, this may be the right question to ask. But most cases do not
raise the dramatic binary choice of either market or no market. Instead,
appreciating a risk that a market structure might bring about in a certain setting
may help to refine the law that governs that setting. Or, there may be a way to at
least ameliorate the risk by deploying countervailing legal devices. Even risks
that cannot be eradicated without sacrificing the advantages of market structures
can generally be managed. While such managing measures should not make
market designers complacent, the possibility of addressing the pertinent pitfalls
invites a more refined analysis, which may yield better results than a binary
decision.
In this Foreword, we inevitably draw an abstract and imprecise picture.
Nonetheless, it seems safe to state that the two main hazards that the market is
said to produce are maldistribution and the commodification of human affairs.
Both concerns are significant, and neither can be fully eliminated. And yet—at
least in certain settings—recognizing them as potential pathologies may indeed
help to identify acceptable legal responses.
Consider first the distributive injustices that markets produce. The market’s
currency of willingness to pay depends not only upon people’s preferences, but
also upon their ability to pay. In certain contexts, this truism is largely
inconsequential, since the pertinent parties’ ability to pay is roughly equal (or
equal enough). But in other contexts, markets “systematically tend to distribute
legal entitlements to the rich, exacerbating inequality.”17 For reasons of political
economy, a subset of these unfortunate distributional consequences are likely to
be rather sticky.18 Regressive consequences threaten to defy any plausible
normative foundation of the law of the market. Therefore, friends of the market
must not perceive these regressive consequences as part of the market’s appeal,
but rather as unfortunate pathological effects that ought to be mitigated where
possible.19
Addressing distributive distortions through the law of the market is a tricky
challenge, especially given the expected responses of legally-informed actors,
noted above in Part III. This means that oftentimes properly confronting this
16. We deliberately use here the term “immanent.” The idea that we can fix the bugs of a certain
contingent market structure by adopting one that better responds to the market’s legitimate normative
underpinnings is already implicit, of course, in the previous Parts.
17. Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649, 1703 (2018).
18. Id. at 1703–04.
19. At least with regard to some accounts of the ideal market, a similar analysis should apply to luck,
which for Frank Knight is the most important feature of the market. See Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of
Competition, 37 Q.J. ECON. 579, 609 (1923) (“The luck element moreover is so large—far larger than
fairly successful participants in the game will ever admit—that capacity and effort may count for
nothing.”).
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challenge requires a broader toolkit, including a background public regime of tax
and redistribution.20 The recursive nature of the game between lawmakers and
the addressees of their prescriptions, as well as the political economy of tax and
welfare legislation, imply, however, that this route is no panacea.
A similar analysis applies to the concern of commodification of people and
their interpersonal relationships. This concern arises most forcefully when
market mechanisms are introduced into a realm of life previously outside the
sphere of commodities. Commodifying personal relations, such as friendship or
romance, or practices with independent logics of value, such as art, sports, or
politics, into the thin monetary terms that typify the market is troublesome, on
this view. Commodification threatens to undermine these independent norms
and to flatten or even efface worthy aspects of a world characterized by plural
normative systems.21 The gravity of this risk of commodification and its scope of
application are disputed.22 For our purposes it is enough to observe that, as with
the concern that markets can be regressive, the risk of devastating
commodification need not imply wholesale rejection of market mechanisms. The
law of the market can employ techniques of incomplete commodification, which
aim at ensuring that, while entitlements are exchanged, interactions retain their
personal aspect or their non-commodity logic of relations.23
These risks of market formations are more or less familiar. Two of the
Articles in this Issue raise another risk, one that may be conceptually different,
in the sense that it might not be similarly ameliorated. In their Articles, both
Katharina Pistor and Przemysław Pałka focus on some of the implications of the
recent rise of online markets, highlighting the danger that these developments
might cause the market to undermine itself. What might seem at first glance to
be a perfection of market logic, they warn us, might end up as a market façade
that is in essence a new form of social planning.
Katharina Pistor’s Article, Rule by Data: The End of Markets?,24 considers
the possible implications of technology—the rise of big data and artificial
20. We use the conventional term, “redistribution,” but must note that it is—at least here—patently
misleading, given that the task is to remedy the distortions that the market’s regressive distribution may
yield.
21. One need not develop a deep commitment to plural normative systems to appreciate the simple
point we advance here. Even in activities organized by high stakes markets, like professional sports, it
would strike any fan as scandalous if an MVP award was simply handed to the player with the highest
salary (because of the salary itself, as a sole indication of what it meant to be “the most valuable player”).
The example might seem frivolous, but it serves to highlight the fact that market and non-market logic
are likely to live side-by-side within many of our everyday practices. The “danger” is usually a question
of a contest between logics and the moments of line-crossing. For the basic argument about plural orders
of valuation, see generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
22. Compare Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), with Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849
(1987).
23. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141–67 (1993);
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 102–14 (1996) (discussing incomplete
commodification).
24. 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 101.
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intelligence, in particular—for the competition between two forms of economic
ordering: market versus hierarchical orderings. Traditionally, this competition is
explained by reference to transaction costs.25 At some point on the transaction
cost scale, it is more efficient to organize economic activities hierarchically (for
example, by creating a firm) than by way of free and open exchange on the
market. Pistor argues that technological transformations might make hierarchical
orderings more efficient than market orderings even when transaction costs are
rather trivial. Instead of engaging in a bargained-for exchange of goods,
consumers would be provided with the goods that best satisfy their bargainindependent preferences. Pistor further worries that economies of scale might
make it more beneficial for mega internet firms (or Big Tech) to control the
information necessary to run this hierarchy-based economic order. This end-ofmarkets script is regrettable, Pistor argues, because it undermines the egalitarian
foundations of market exchange and subjects people to domination by powerful,
private entities. Her solution considers two possible legal avenues. The first
builds on property law. Pistor believes that data should have been made res
communis in the first place. But since lawmakers have failed to do so, she
identifies an alternative avenue—business organization law—as a source of
recognizing consumers as holders of collective rights in data. This remedy may
not bring back market orderings, but it could provide a substantial antidote to
consumer domination by Big Tech’s data.
Przemysław Pałka’s Algorithmic Central Planning: Between Efficiency and
Freedom26 also wonders whether big data and algorithmic processing might lead
market mechanisms to undermine the practices of individual choice on which
conventional market logics depend. By making individual preferences
computable, these technological innovations promise—or threaten—to build an
effectively-planned economy through the incremental empowering of private
central planners rather than through the revolutionary creation of a centrally
planning state. Pałka proposes that soon, if not already today, companies such as
Google, Facebook, and Amazon will know more about individual people’s
preferences than will the individuals themselves, and these firms’ algorithms will
be able to satisfy people’s preferences more accurately, and at lower transaction
costs, than the people’s own choices. This produces a powerful pressure to
displace the individual market transactions that presently organize production
and consumption with decision-by-algorithm, which is just central planning by
another name. Pałka worries both about the processes that will yield this
transformation, and about the eventual outcome. Will we choose, with collective
or even individual deliberation, to cede our market choices to algorithmic
planning? And even if algorithms actually do better satisfy our preferences than
our own market choices could, is an algorithmically-planned economy desirable?
Or, alternatively, is the act of choosing valuable apart from its results, so that
choice is not a transaction cost but rather, as one might say, a transaction benefit?
25. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
26. 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 125.

FINAL - FOREWORD (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2020]

7/5/2020 8:08 PM

THE LAW OF THE MARKET

xi

V
RESPONSIBILITY
Some discussions of the market obscure another important proposition.
Market forces—the actions of buyers and sellers that affect the availability and
price of goods and services—are sometimes presented as or assumed to be either
prior to law or beyond law’s responsibility. This presupposition is the flipside of
the conventional use of government intervention noted above.27 In this view, law
can, for better or for worse, only respond to—control, influence, affect—market
forces. But it cannot be held responsible for these powers in and of themselves.
If what we have said thus far is correct, the conventional view is partial and
misleading. The market is an artifact shaped by humans and can be variously
designed. Describing the conventional view as artificial is not a condemnation.
After all, most of the important aspects of our social life are human-made. Just
like the study of other valuable human-made institutions, a clear-headed
understanding and analysis of markets should be careful not to essentialize the
current instantiation of the market, as if it were completely beyond human
control.
Richard Brooks’s Article, Black Markets and the Exchange Structure,28
challenges the central role that we give law in constructing markets while aspiring
to avoid the naturalism and essentialism about markets that we reject. Brooks
proposes that every society has an “exchange structure”—a set of norms and
practices that governs transactions among the society’s members with an eye to
preserving respect for its own rules. The exchange structure, for Brooks, precedes
the state and its laws, and law enters the scene to stabilize and validate this
structure. Critically, Brooks insists, the problems of legitimacy and stability never
get a conclusive resolution—the need to preserve the exchange structure against
decay never subsides. Moreover, Brooks observes, a zero-tolerance policy
towards deviants rarely, if ever, best promotes stability. Instead, exchange
structures must find ways to de-fang violations of their rules—to cabin
deviations—in a manner that supports the survival of the very rules and systems
that the deviants challenge. They must, Brooks says, evolve “various strategies
allowing transgression while limiting [transgression’s] follow-on consequences”
in order to maintain the structure’s durability.29 Black markets, for Brooks, serve
precisely this role. And a study of their normative structure—their mix of express
prohibitions and implicit permissions—reveals something deep about the role of
the law in sustaining, and giving a normative frame to, markets generally.
The power of the law is not limitless. As we’ve seen, the law of the market
faces constraints. To begin with, for markets to exist as realms of voluntary
transactions, there must be limits on legal coercion in and around market
activities. That said, because it is law that sets up the rules of the game—the
27. See supra Part II.
28. 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 151.
29. Id. at 171.
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contours of people’s Hohfeldian powers as owners and promisees, as well as their
access to money—law necessarily engages in market-making. Therefore, even
where its workings should be somewhat constrained, the law cannot be
completely detached from responsibility for the transactions it both authorizes
and enforces, and from the societal results of that transactional world.30
Avihay Dorfman’s Article, The Limited Case for Discrimination’s Legality,31
considers non-contingent constraints on the legal enforcement of
antidiscrimination duties. He asks what principled concerns might justify
relieving market actors of the proscriptions of antidiscrimination law. Although
there may be any number of epistemic and instrumental hurdles to calling the
moral duty against discrimination into law, Dorfman argues for a substantive
concern, namely, free agency. On this concern, a liberal law of the market must
treat private persons, including those who act from discriminatory motivation, as
free and equal agents. Doing so requires recognizing that such persons are
entitled to change their minds by revising their discriminatory motivations and
acting in conformity with the demands of right reason (narrowly defined to
exclude clear instances of bigotry). Dorfman distinguishes between an outward
act of refusing to deal with another and its underlying illicit motivation. He then
argues that holding a bigot legally responsible for acquiring morally unacceptable
motives while executing a perfectly legitimate act undermines the bigot’s free
agency. The explanation is that the law denies him or her the opportunity to act,
including by repeating the refusal to deal with another, on the basis of morally
sound motives by revising the current one.
More generally, the law of the market, both when it coerces and when it
authorizes, has profound implications for people’s lives. Therefore, for the law of
the market to be legitimate, let alone just, it should be designed in a way that is
both attentive to the dangers and the limitations we’ve discussed and normatively
acceptable.32
Recognizing the role of law in shaping markets drives a better understanding
of their plasticity and thus helps clarify thinking about how markets might be
designed. That has been our primary task, but clarity engenders an additional
task. When we recognize the law’s role in designing markets and appreciate the
30. The idea of responsibility we use here may strike the reader as a bit unorthodox (it is certainly
quite far from the idea of responsibility in say, torts or criminal law). What we have in mind is that
designing the law of the market should take into account the expected results of the adopted design. The
fact that system design does not ensure particular results with known individuals as winners and losers
does not absolve the designer from the task of considering overall effects (just as the designers of
highways must take into account actual driving without knowing who in particular will need to use the
road-shoulder). We do not intend by this to collapse into one another different levels of responsibility,
for instance those of particular actors and those of system designers.
31. 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2020, at 175.
32. This requirement of justifiability is shared not only by natural lawyers, but also by positivists,
who acknowledge that law’s claim to authority implies (as Joseph Raz put it) that “it is essential to the
law that it recognizes that its use of power is answerable to moral standards and claims to have reconciled
power and morality.” JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY
OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 1 (2009).
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range of choices open to the architects of the law of the market, we must then ask
about the normative underpinnings of markets. These architects should evaluate
existing market formations and either reject, reform, or perhaps embrace them—
but the evaluations must not, and cannot possibly, rest on a merely technical
account of what makes a market. Instead, they should realize that different
market designs have different normative implications. Indeed, recognizing the
crucial role of law in the construction of markets and appreciating that markets
are complex phenomena with heterogeneous manifestations does not, and should
not, dissipate controversies. Quite the contrary: it highlights the significance of
the competing normative ideals for which the market can stand.
VI
NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
The Articles in this Issue highlight the options, limits, dangers, and
responsibilities that the legal construction of markets entails. These are all
necessary aspects of a legally-informed study of the market. But they are still not
sufficient. The market, as noted, is a thick ethical concept, which means that such
a study necessarily implicates an analysis of the various normative ideals markets
can serve. We thus conclude with a brief outline of three normative market ideals:
efficient markets, democratic markets, and liberal markets.
Efficient markets are designed so as to maximize economic output. An
approach to markets that emphasizes efficiency thus takes an essentially
allocative view of markets. It evaluates market orderings neither in light of the
relations that they underwrite among traders nor in terms of the relations that
they produce between traders and the state, but rather according to the ways in
which markets distribute goods in service of investment, production, and,
ultimately, consumption.
Efficiency-based approaches therefore treat markets instrumentally, as
technologies for producing outcomes that are assessed as desirable (or not)
without making any essential reference to their having been produced by means
of market exchanges. Typically, these approaches assess market outcomes using
the technical language of efficiency developed by economists. This includes, for
example, the Kaldor-Hicks conception that dominates both the law and
economics of contract, property, and torts and the cost-benefit analysis deployed
in administrative law and the study of regulation. This is why we use the term
“efficient markets.” But the basic structure of these approaches does not require
that they evaluate outcomes using precisely this metric. All that is essential is that
they view markets as a means to an end. That end might be utilitarian (the
greatest good for the greatest number) or even egalitarian (on any one of many
conceptions of equality). The core of the view lies in the maximizing, not the
maximand.
Democratic markets have a very different ideal in mind. Markets are sites for
exchanging entitlements over resources. Often, an idealized image of the market
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presents that exchange as if it could completely circumvent disagreements and
disputes about the underlying reasons people have for valuing certain resources
or activities above others. The shorthand for that idealization is that the market
is a place where the buyer votes with her dollars, and nobody questions why she
values one product over another. This shorthand describes some markets quite
well. Its underlying normative vision—according to which depersonalized and
apolitical markets allow for cooperative behavior among people otherwise
potentially disposed to conflict—certainly has its attractions. But it may sell short
the potential markets hold for advancing active participation in the value
conflicts that govern our lives.
Control over resources implies authority over others, so if markets are the
locus of transacting for entitlements to control, then they are intertwined
inevitably with authority relations. The design of markets thus necessarily raises
questions as to how authority should be allocated, what kinds of authority
relationships are acceptable, and what society should demand of authority
relations, particularly among strangers. Given the plasticity of markets outlined
above, it seems plausible that the law could contribute to market formations with
a range of authority relations vis-à-vis various resources. We could imagine
authority heavily concentrated, or widely dispersed. We could imagine it
protected by substantive and procedural barriers, or porous and open to
contestation. Perhaps most concretely, we can imagine authority as established
in a sense that closes off disagreement about underlying value, or alternatively as
open to challenge precisely on that ground.
Contestation over underlying values need not obviate the market; in certain
cases, it might give participation in a market its full meaning. When market
participants articulate the contestation over values, they highlight the activity as
a social arrangement, as a set of relationships among people, rather than mere
exchange of inert objects. If conditions are right (for example, if the law of the
market makes it possible), market participants can call into question the givenness of relations that currently govern work and property ownership, breaking
down reification. In the best-case scenario, market participants use their market
voice to animate their moral and political lives, to assert self-government in
contexts crucial for their well-being and flourishing.
Four of the Articles in this Issue put questions of democratic participation in
markets into focus. Desan’s Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in
Neoclassical and Credit Approaches to Money33 reminds us that the model of
money creation dominated by an independent central bank in cooperation with
commercial banks is geared toward a limitation of democratic input. Pistor’s Rule
by Data34 shows how tech giants have succeeded (so far) in limiting active
participation by end users regarding authority over the data mined from their
online activity. Pałka’s Algorithmic Central Planning35 worries that individual acts
33. See generally Desan, supra note 2.
34. See generally Pistor, supra note 24.
35. See generally Pałka, supra note 26.

FINAL - FOREWORD (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2020]

7/5/2020 8:08 PM

THE LAW OF THE MARKET

xv

could cumulate to produce a planned economy without any collective decision.
And Thelen’s Employer Organization and the Law: American Exceptionalism in
Comparative Perspective36 shows how well-targeted legal activism managed to
thwart organizational attempts in one legal context, while similar ventures
succeeded in another. Each of these Articles might be generalized thus: one of
the features at stake in the design of markets is the allocation of authority. There
are ways to allocate that authority that encourage continued participation in the
contestation over underlying values, and ways to limit such participation.
We denote the third market ideal-type a liberal market since it grounds
markets in the moral quality of individual traders rather than in collective
benefits. Once again, a range of views all embrace this liberal frame, even as they
fill in its details very differently. Three views in particular bear mentioning here.
First, and on the right side of the liberal spectrum, libertarian views
emphasize the role that markets play in securing individual freedom. Some (in
our minds less plausible) varieties of libertarianism about markets flirt with a
naturalized account of property entitlements and even the basic rules of contract.
These views propose that markets respect liberty against this naturalized
backdrop, by protecting people against involuntary expropriation or enforced
exchange. Other varieties of libertarianism (perhaps most profoundly, Hayek’s)
emphasize both the informational and the normative problems that confront
alternatives to market-based ways of organizing economic life.37 Planning, in
particular, requires enormous quantities of information concerning both
preferences and capabilities. And even if the purely fact-based informational
problems confronting planning can be solved (perhaps through developments in
algorithmic data processing), planners still face daunting evaluative and
normative challenges. People value different things for different reasons, and
planners cannot do their jobs without deciding which values are true and
authoritative. But when planners make such evaluative judgments, they
wrongfully usurp the proper independence and offend against the dignity of the
people whose lives they plan. This is a subtle defense of markets, and far from
the market fundamentalism that the other sort of libertarianism invites. In
particular, the wrong of planning is tied to the central, authoritative declaration
of what is valuable. Therefore, not every state intervention in economic life
commits this wrong. That is why Hayek, who abhorred planning, did not object
to regulation, especially where regulation serves to promote widespread
participation in market life or to prevent private forms of domination from
arising.38
The problem of disagreement about value that exercises some libertarians
also underwrites the second, left-leaning, egalitarian variant of liberal approaches
36. See generally Thelen, supra note 2.
37. See generally F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (Univ. of Chi. Press 2011) (1960)
[hereinafter THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY]; F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Univ. of Chi.
Press 2007) (1944).
38. See THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY, supra note 37, at 193–210.
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to markets. When people value different things for different reasons, economic
and social coordination depend on establishing a shared language of value that
people can deploy for purposes of their commercial lives. Market prices establish
this language of value. The price of a good (at least in an idealized pure exchange
economy) equals what everyone else must give up for its owner to possess it, as
measured by a formally equal amalgam of all of their preferences. This thought
leads some left-liberals (perhaps most notably, Ronald Dworkin) to insist that,
far from being forces against equality, markets are essential for economic
equality to be intelligible at all.39 Without prices and the commensuration of value
that they make possible, it is impossible to know who has how much. It is
therefore also impossible to say who has more, and who has less, than justice
requires. One of us has gone even farther, to argue that the normative structure
of market exchange, and in particular the authority relations produced by the
contracts through which market exchange occurs, establishes a form of valuable
market solidarity that stands beside the political solidarity produced by
democratic politics in the liberal states in which markets typically thrive.40 Of
course, this approach faces challenges just like any other, perhaps most notably
the challenge that fiat money’s connection to politics and the state (not least
through modern central banking) deprives prices of the egalitarian quality and
commensurate power on which equality of resources or market solidarity
depend.41 Here, a great deal will turn on whether some version of Hayek’s
distinction between regulation and planning may be introduced into left-liberal
theory, to renovate prices in the face of the challenge posed by money’s political
nature.
Finally, the third variation of liberal markets relies on individual autonomy,
rather than independence. It thus begins with the proposition that for people to
lead the fully human life they are entitled to, law must be committed to enhancing
their self-determination (or self-authorship).42 Markets are potentially conducive
to people’s self-determination because they allow individuals the mobility
necessary for self-determination, and since they expand the options available to
individuals to function as the authors of their own lives.
Markets, more specifically, enable the liquidation of existing holdings and
thus facilitate people’s right to exit: to withdraw or refuse to further engage, to
dissociate, to cut themselves out of a relationship with other persons. Exit, in turn,
is crucial to autonomy because open boundaries enable geographical, social,
familial, professional, and political mobility, which are prerequisites for a selfdirected life. Markets further extend this autonomy-enhancing function by
39. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981).
40. See Daniel Markovits, Market Solidarity, Inaugural Lecture as Guido Calabresi Professor of
Law at Yale Law School (Apr. 9, 2012).
41. This challenge is developed in Christine Desan’s contribution to this Issue, supra note 2.
42. The remainder of this Part summarizes Hanoch Dagan, Why Markets? Welfare, Autonomy, and
The Just Society, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1289 (2019); Hanoch Dagan, Markets for Self-Authorship, 28
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 577 (2018).
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broadening the scope of choices between differing projects and ways of life. By
facilitating people’s ability to legitimately enlist one another in the pursuit of
private goals and purposes and creating a structure that multiplies the
alternatives people can choose from, markets enable the individual to act—on
her own or with the cooperation of others—upon her own goals, values,
objectives, and her plan of life, without subordination to any other individual or
subjection to any collective decision making procedure.
Markets with the primary goal of autonomy enhancement will have several
characteristics. Autonomy-enhancing markets must allow universal participation
since exclusion and discrimination would undermine their raison d’être. They
should also set limits on the power to alienate whenever it erodes our ability to
rewrite our life stories and start anew. Such markets should proactively ensure
meaningful choices in each major sphere of human action and interaction.
However, this injunction of intra-sphere multiplicity must be curtailed where
cognitive, behavioral, structural, and political economy reasons imply that more
choice may actually reduce autonomy.43 Moreover, when markets are structured
to serve autonomy, market relationships are governed by rules that require
reciprocal respect for self-determination, meaning that party interactions in the
market are governed by the maxim of relational justice.44 Furthermore, since
utility is understood to be instrumental to the markets’ ultimate value—
autonomy—the law of the market must avoid the commodification of people and
interpersonal relationships. It should thus employ, in some subsets of the settings
it governs, the techniques of incomplete commodification, noted earlier, which
ensure that these market interactions retain a personal aspect.45
Finally, an autonomy-based law of the market must be particularly careful not
to marginalize the broader picture, in which the justice of the market is partially
dependent upon a background regime that guarantees the conditions of
individual self-determination. Rather than striving to exclusivity, the law of the
market, in this view, is attuned to its distinct autonomy-enhancing tasks of
enabling mobility and expanding choice, while acknowledging the indispensable
role of other social institutions in enabling these vital functions.
VII
CONCLUSION
Every market order is the result of a complex set of legal and political choices.
This Foreword has offered an intellectual roadmap for a legally informed study
of the market. Drawing on the insight that markets are plural and open to

43. For the prescription of intra-sphere multiplicity, see HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER,
THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 67–134 (2017).
44. See generally Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1395
(2016); Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Justice for Contracts (Aug. 11, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3435781 [https://perma.cc/9Q3S-RU2X].
45. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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variable design, it reflects on both the options and constraints faced by law’s
architects. It discusses certain familiar and less familiar risks in market design. In
order to understand the risks and rewards of market orderings and to take on the
responsibility of market design, this Foreword identifies three ideal-typical
visions of markets—efficient, democratic, and liberal—and summarizes the
values that these ideal-types deploy to address these challenges.

